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Time and Utopia: the gap between Morris and Bax 
 
William Morris’s personal friendship and close working relationship with 
Ernest Belfort Bax is problematic for many Morris scholars. As Roger Aldous 
has persuasively argued, Bax’s reputation as a misogynist and his well-known 
dispute with Eleanor Marx Aveling on the question of women’s emancipation 
have badly sullied his standing in socialist circles, notwithstanding the 
originality and richness of his thought; the risk that Morris might be tainted by 
association helps explain Bax’s neglect in Morris studies and, indeed, the 
desire on the part of leading Morris scholars to emphasise the incongruence 
of their collaboration.(1) Yet Aldous’s conclusion that that the differences 
between Morris and Bax ‘are more than outweighed by similarities’ seems too 
strong.(2) In contesting this claim, I examine Morris and Bax’s concept of 
time. I argue that there was an important variance in their understanding of 
historical change and that the gap between them pointed to an important 
difference in the approach they adopted toward the future. 
The joint statement in the second edition of the Manifesto of the Socialist 
League (1885) is a useful starting point for the discussion. In the statement, 
Morris and Bax describe history as a dialectical, spiralling movement:   
 
… we look forward to the time when any definite exchange will 
have entirely ceased to exist; just as it never existed in that 
primitive Communism which preceded Civilisation. 
The enemy will say, “This is retrogression not progress”; to which 
we answer, All progress, every distinctive stage of progress, 
involves a backward as well as a forward movement; the new 
development returns to a point which represents the older principle 
elevated to a higher plane; the old principle reappears transformed, 
purified, made stronger, and ready to advance on the fuller life it 
has gained through its seeming death.  As an illustration (imperfect 
as all illustrations must be) take the case of advance on a straight 
line and on a spiral, - the progress of all life must be not on the 
straight line, but on the spiral. (3) 
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The body of the paper considers the ways in which this common idea played 
itself out in Morris and Bax’s single-authored work.  My contention is that 
while they were able to generalise their positions in important jointly-authored 
work, their ideas differed in significant ways.  Since Morris and Bax drew 
attention to the convergence of their views, pointedly describing  Socialism: Its 
Growth and Outcome (1896) as ‘a collaboration’ in ‘the true sense of the 
word’, ‘each sentence having been carefully considered by both the authors in 
common’, the claim is perhaps foolhardy.(4) Nevertheless, my suggestion is 
that Morris and Bax read different ideas into the framework of the theory of 
change and that they not only held divergent views about the dynamics of 
history, but that this divergence suggested an important difference in their 
assessments of history’s epistemic value were also incompatible. The depth 
of this disagreement was made plain by the attitudes they took towards the 
role of utopianism in socialist thought – an issue I consider at the end of the 
paper.   
 
Socialism and ethics 
One of the key tenets of Morris and Bax’s socialist thought was the idea that 
the transition from capitalism to socialism involved an ethical change as well 
as the transformation of the socio-economic system.  In the early 1880s, this 
conviction was expressed in their commitment to ‘the religion of socialism’, a 
concept which, as Anna Vaninskaya has shown, was open to a wide variety of 
competing interpretations.(5) For Morris and Bax, it underpinned a shared 
belief that the primary purpose of socialist activism was to ‘make socialists’, 
not push for immediate ‘practical’ reform. Socialism, they argued, was not just 
a system of production, distribution and exchange, it described a set of social 
relations and a particular moral consciousness.  Finding insufficient support 
for this view in the Social Democratic Federation, and quarrelling with H.M. 
Hyndman on the question of socialist strategy, in 1884 Morris and Bax quit the 
Social Democratic Federation to found the Socialist League.(6)  Free, there, 
to determine their own priorities, they included this statement in the Manifesto:  
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A new system of industrial production must necessarily bear with it 
its own morality.  Morality, which in a due state of Society … 
mean[s] nothing more than the responsibility of the individual man 
to the social whole of which he forms a part … 
The economical change which we advocate, therefore, would not 
be stable unless accompanied by a corresponding revolution in 
ethics, which, however, is certain to accompany it, since the two 
things are inseparable elements of one whole, to wit social 
evolution. (7) 
 
Bax and Morris linked the ethic of socialism with justice and both 
grounded it in sentiment.  For Bax, justice was underpinned by solidarity or 
brotherhood. Invoking this term Bax did not mean to suggest that communism 
implied ‘an equally close personal affection for, or intimacy with, everybody’ – 
a notion he thought absurd - but ‘the practical recognition of mutual sympathy 
in the affairs of life and in the recognition of the same ideal aims’.(8) Morris 
similarly rooted socialist ethics in feeling and he described its expression in a 
number of ways. In News From Nowhere the ethical principle is described as 
one of kindness to strangers.(9)  In his correspondence with the Rev. Bainton, 
Morris echoed the terms of the Manifesto to describe it as a ‘religious sense of 
the responsibility of each man to each and all of his fellows’ or ‘the habitual 
love of humanity’.(10) In his story of the 1381 Peasants’ Revolt, The Dream of 
John Ball, he identified socialist ethics with fellowship, using the Judeo-
Christian term to describe a sense of belonging to an earthly community: 
 
Forsooth, ye have heard it said that ye shall do well in this world 
that in the world to come ye may live happily for ever; do you well 
then, and have your reward both on earth and in heaven; for I say 
to you that earth and heaven are not two but one … Forsooth, 
brethren, will ye murder the Church any one of you, and go forth a 
wandering man and lonely ... what an evil doom is this, to be an 
outcast … to have none to love you and to speak with you, to be 
without fellowship!  Forsooth brothers, fellowship is heaven, and 
lack of fellowship is hell: fellowship is life, and lack of fellowship is 
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death: and the deeds that ye do upon the earth, it is for fellowship’s 
sake that ye do them, and the life that is in it, that shall live on and 
on for ever, and each one of you part of it, while many a man’s life 
upon the earth from the earth shall wane. (11) 
 
Ethics and the dynamic of history 
So-describing the principles of socialist ethics Bax and Morris agreed that 
ethical change was part of a wider process of historical development.  Both, 
moreover, understood it as a dialectical process. Of the two, Bax’s view was 
by far the most elaborate. His sociological analysis mapped three different 
models of social relations – or what he called expressions of consciousness - 
onto complementary systems of moral and religious thought.  Using the 
terminology that that found its way into the Manifesto, he dubbed the models 
‘primitive’ or ‘natural’ communism, individualism and future communism.  The 
systems of religious thought were pagan-classical, early Christian and 
Protestant and the religion of socialism.  Bax’s view was that poised at a point 
of transition from this middle stage - the individualism of Protestantism - and 
that future communism and that the religion of socialism would emerge in the 
next phase of development. As the transcendence of primitive communism 
and individualism, it would bear the primary characteristics of primitive 
communism - duty and solidarity - but in a manner mediated by the history of 
individualism.  Importantly, in contrast to primitive communism which was 
bounded by ties of blood or kinship, the religion of socialism would support a 
global, generalised duty based on the recognition of the equality of 
peoples.(12) Equally, unlike individualism, which defined duty in relation to 
law, all-too frequently giving rise to conflicts between individual moral 
responsibility and respect for rules, it would resolve the tension between 
conscience and obedience.    
In Morris’s writings it is difficult to find either a formal analysis of 
historical change or a full-blown account of moral development. Nevertheless, 
As A.L. Morton notes, Morris’s reflection on the change beyond the change in 
The Dream of John Ball is rightly regarded as a description of ‘the dialectic of 
history’ (13).  In a long dialogue with John Ball in the closing chapters of the 
book, Morris elaborated his view. Like Bax, he identified three movements in 
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the dialectic.  The first movement is negative.  Morris tells John Ball that the 
King’s petitioners will ‘fight and lose the battle’ and the Revolt will be put down 
(14). The second is a partial reverse: ‘the thing they fought for comes about in 
spite of their defeat and when it comes turns out not to be what they meant’.  
As Morris explains, the suppression of the revolt results in the abolition of the 
category of ‘villein’ and equality is granted to all.  However changes in the 
terms of labour cement the status of the newly freed villeins as ‘thrall’ as the 
new freedom consists only of the formal right to sell ‘the power of … labour’ 
for a subsistence wage (15).  Morris tells Ball, ‘all power shall be in the hands 
of … foul swine’ and ‘times of plenty shall … be the times of famine’. (16) The 
final movement is positive: the new tyranny is overcome as ‘other men … fight 
for what they meant under another name’.(17)  From his nineteenth century 
vantage point, Morris identified this movement with the struggle for socialism.  
‘[M]ake no mistake’ he wrote in Justice, ‘about the cause for which Wat Tyler 
and his worthier associate John Ball fell; they were fighting against the 
fleecing of the people by that particular form of fleecing then in fashion, viz.: 
serfdom or villeinage …’. (18)  The oppressed of the fourteenth-century could 
not think of themselves as socialists, but their cause was the same and it was 
the duty of nineteenth-century revolutionaries to deliver the transformation 
that they had been denied. 
 
Philosophies of history 
Given that the terms of Bax’s historical sociology found their way into the 
Manifesto, it seems reasonable to assume that Morris believed his own 
sketchier treatment of the dialectic was compatible with it. Yet Bax’s sociology 
was underpinned by a metaphysical philosophy that was absent in Morris’s 
historical account.  Both men identified two main factors in historical change 
or what Bax, in a nod to Auguste Comte, called ‘social dynamics’: the ethical 
and the material. But whereas Bax’s philosophy suggested the impossibility of 
finding a model of socialist ethics in the past, Morris’s history pointed in 
precisely the opposite direction: the past held the key to the future. The 
explanation lies in their philosophical outlooks. 
Bax called the ‘two main factors’ of historical development ‘outward 
material circumstance (mainly economic in its character)’ and ideas, 
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expressed in the ‘the spontaneity of human intelligence’.(19)  These factors 
did not stand in causal relation to one another: Bax rejected the idea that 
historical change could be conceptualised as a parallel movement in which 
idealism somehow triggered or was triggered by material changes.  Instead 
he claimed that ‘history consists in the unity of these two lines in their action 
and reaction’ and that both evolved autonomously, neither being ultimately 
reducible to the other. (20) Bax also rejected the proposition that the evolution 
of ideas followed a logical path – a position he attributed to Hegel – making 
the possibility of their ‘mechanical determination’ conceivable.  Human beings, 
he conceded, grasped history only by their reason and therefore understood it 
as a rational process.  But it did not follow from this that history was in fact a 
process of Reason unfolding – in whatever relation it might be said to stand to 
the material forces with which it reacted. To believe this was to confuse the 
terms of history’s understanding with the process of its development and to 
assume wrongly, Bax argued, that individuals were first and foremost 
creatures of thought.  This was not the case: they were primarily creatures of 
experience, will and feeling. Returning to the Cartesian roots of modern 
philosophy, he argued that the significance of the thinking being as a category 
for reflection did not rest in  ‘the “intelligible” principle’ – thought – but in ‘the 
“I” which thinks’ – the passionate will. Following Schopenhauer (whose 
essays he translated), Bax referred to as this as the alogical element of 
knowledge, and he identified it as the real driver of historical change. (21)  
 Bax’s identification of the alogical or the will as the primary force which 
realised itself through the complex interplay of ideal and material forces 
shaped his image of history as a spiral, an idea which appeared not only in 
the Manifesto but in a number of his single-authored works. Though Bax 
would not have approved it, his image resonated with classical science. 
Writing more than a hundred years earlier, Voltaire observed that Newton had 
demonstrated that an ‘infinitely little’ change in the direction of a ‘finite line’ 
resulted in an ‘infinite curve’. With this wonderful new knowledge it was 
possible to contemplate ‘squares of infinity, cubes of infinity and infinite 
infinities’. (22)  Bax imagined something similar: ‘wheels’ of infinity powering 
changes in consciousness and material existence. His idea was that infinitely 
small expressions of will made it possible to comprehend the apparently linear 
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path of history as an infinite progression, each complex movement 
representing a further stage in ethical development. (23)   
Morris’s treatment of the forces of historical development bore none of 
the hallmarks of Bax’s metaphysical philosophy, though he too argued that it 
was possible to identify material and ideal factors as dynamics of change and 
agreed that it was impossible to prioritise one over the other, as if in a causal 
relation. In The Dream of John Ball he traced the broad outlines of historical 
development from the fourteenth to the nineteenth century.  On the one hand, 
he examined the process of economic development, telling the resolute but 
incredulous John Ball about the development of industry, mechanisation and 
the expansion of production, the de-skilling of labour and the rise of a novel 
and terrible tyranny of work; the private appropriation of the common lands, 
the rise of a new idle class of owners and the skewing of the market towards 
the consumption of useless things.  On the other, he explored concomitant 
changes in ideas and behaviours, comparing the heady aspirations of John 
Ball’s toilers to the cowed resignation of nineteenth-century workers. In John 
Ball’s eyes the willingness of the latter to accept the fleecing of capitalism 
seemingly without complaint indicated a complicity in their own oppression. 
(24) Morris agreed but tempered this critique.  Nineteenth century workers 
were not the ‘sluggards, dolts, and cowards’ that John Ball condemned. They 
lacked the burning sense of injustice that had motivated their forebears 
because they had been seduced by capitalism’s competitive logic. Mistakenly 
regarding themselves as free men and equal to their masters, they had been 
pacified by the slim probability that they might emerge as beneficiaries of 
market exchange.  Morris explained: they had been ‘blinded to the robbing of 
themselves by others, because they shall hope in their souls that they may 
each live to rob others’. (25)  
According to this analysis, one of the key differences between fourteenth 
and nineteenth-century workers was historical luck. The development of 
material forces suggested that the latter stood at a point of potential 
transformation: capitalism was ripe for revolution.  However there was another 
important difference between the two generations: moral courage. For 
nineteenth century workers the windows of historical change were ajar but, in 
contrast to John Ball’s men, they lacked the wherewithal to throw them open 
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and force through the material and ethical changes that revolutionary 
socialism demanded. For the fourteenth century men, the situation was the 
precisely the reverse. They had the will to fight injustice but, in material terms, 
stood at the cusp of capitalism’s development. So although Morris believed 
that their cause was frustrated by their deference to, and misplaced trust in 
their masters, the odds of achieving revolutionary change were always 
stacked against them.  
By linking the struggles of fourteenth and nineteenth century workers, 
Morris identified socialist ethics with past hope in a way that suggested 
continuity in history. On his understanding, the religion of socialism could not 
be conceptualised, as Bax imagined, as a the result of a process of 
transcendence, linked to historical changes in consciousness, rooted in the 
endless, unpredictable expression of will. For Morris, the religion of socialism 
was the part of the transformation to socialism but it was also a principal 
factor motivating that transformation. Moreover, whilst will – or passion - 
played an important role in securing change, central to Morris’s view was a 
constant willingness to suffer defeat. To this extent, his understanding of 
history had more in common with traditional notions of eternity than with the 
fantastic possibilities of modern calculus. In 1649 ‘free-born’ John Lilburne 
declared that the Levellers ‘cause and principles do through their own natural 
truth and lustre get ground in men’s understandings so that though we fail, our 
truths prosper. And posterity we doubt not shall reap the benefit of our 
endeavours’. (26) For Morris, too, history played a key role in animating the 
will because the memory of past actions was a driver for future hope. Like 
Lilburne, Morris thus linked the capacity for action and the power of fellowship 
to an appreciation of the cyclical rhythms of nature: birth, death and re-birth. 
Men live, Morris says ‘”because the world liveth”’. (27) Developing the theme 
John Ball tells him that ‘”this is but an old tale that men must die; and I will tell 
thee another, to wit, that they live; and I live now and shall live”’. (28)  Morris 
agrees: 
 
that though I die and end, yet mankind yet liveth, therefore I end 
not, since I am a man … or at the least even so thou doest, since 
now thou art ready to die in grief and torment rather than be 
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unfaithful to the Fellowship, yea rather than fail to work thine 
utmost for it ... And as thou doest, so now doth many a poor man 
unnamed and unknown, and shall do while the world lasteth: and 
they that do less than this, fail because of fear, and are ashamed of 
their cowardice, and make many tales to themselves to deceive 
themselves, lest they should grow too much ashamed to live. (29) 
 
It is possible to see how Morris could picture such movements of will in 
the terms Bax preferred. The image of the spiral, which did not appear in 
Morris’s work, might as easily be seen to represent cycles in the struggle for 
fellowship over time as expressions of the alogical. But if the imagery worked 
for both men, this coincidence of view could not conceal their strong 
disagreement about the status of history as a source of knowledge for the 
future. 
 
History and Utopia 
Morris and Bax re-examined the concept of historical change and future 
socialism in a series of articles published in Commonweal, later published as 
Socialism: Its Growth and Outcome. Apart from embellishing the argument 
about ethical development, they argued that the future is necessarily 
unknowable because the past, on which any future projection is based, is also 
uncertain.  However vivid and accurate history might appear to be, it can only 
be ‘our picture of the past’; less a ‘picture of what really took place’ than an 
image infused with ‘the present which we experience’. (30) Knowing that 
history would progress and being able to describe a process of historical 
change could not, therefore, provide any insight into how the ethic of 
socialism might be realised and what tomorrow might look like. At best, it was 
possible to make informed guesses about which features of the present were 
likely to disappear but it was pointless to speculate on the ways in which ‘the 
void’ might be filled. (31)  
 Neither Bax nor Morris allowed claims about historical knowledge to 
inhibit their speculations. The chapters ‘Socialism Triumphant’ in Socialism 
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From the Root Up give a pretty full sketch of their principal ideas. The picture 
presented in Socialism Its Growth and Outcome is even more elaborate, 
delving even into ‘petty’ issues of costume.(32)  In their single-authored work, 
too, they left a clear picture of the ways in which they thought history might 
progress. Bax veered from dry planning to fantastic speculative philosophy. 
His essay ‘The Morrow of the Revolution’ (a title taken up by Morris in the 
opening of News From Nowhere) acknowledged the importance of discussing 
what socialists would do with power, were they ever to achieve it. To meet 
concerns about the need for practical policy, it outlined a number of likely 
initiatives. (33) With closer attention to the spiral, Bax also set out his ideas 
about the likely future development of material and ideal forces. There was a 
strong possibility, he suggested, that the ‘direct influence’ of material factors 
on ‘spontaneous psychological movement’ might be reduced ‘to the 
minimum’. For the first time in human evolution, social change might be 
‘consciously shaped by the will of man’. (34)  The idea of the free will was a 
marvellous prospect.   
Whilst Bax was prepared to think about the possibilities that the future 
might hold, his philosophy of history ruled against utopianism.  Writing in 
1891, the same year that News From Nowhere was published, he wrote: 
 
The current popularity of Utopian romances, hailed with such joy by 
some, is not, perhaps, a very edifying sign. It indicates a demand 
for miracles … For it would be nothing less than a miracle for any 
human being to describe in prophetic vision the society of the 
future. What is effected in Utopian socialist writings is merely a 
travesty of the society of the present, or of the past. We can define, 
that is, lay down, in the abstract, the general principles on which 
the society of the future will be based, but we cannot describe, that 
is, picture, in the concrete, any state of society of which the world 
has had no experience. For into the reality of a society, even in its 
broader details, there enters a large element of contingency, of 
alogicality, of unreason, with which no general principles will furnish 
us. In consequence of this, the detail, the reality, has to be supplied 
by the Utopian romancer, from states of society already realised in 
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the past or the present. The new principles are then superimposed 
upon a basis already formed of old principles, and a hybrid pseudo-
reality is produced, which is neither past, present, nor future. (35) 
 
Bax’s hostility to utopianism can be explained by his metaphysics.  Believing 
that historical change was predicated on the behaviours of wilful beings acting 
in particular contexts and that reason could only capture the outward 
appearance of the changes that they brought into being, he also believed that 
evolution could be known only as a process: its inner content or what, 
following Schopenhauer, Bax called its ‘presentment’ was by definition 
unknowable.  In Problems of Mind and Morals he explained:  
 
To obtain a true presentment of any period of history we should, of 
course, have to identify the content of our consciousness with the 
content of a consciousness of a past age. This is what the historical 
imagination endeavours to attain. But such reconstruction as the 
historical imagination by means of research and archaeological lore 
can effect, must obviously remain, in its total result, an artificial 
product, since its correspondence with fact cannot be controlled by 
a reference to the living reality. And, again, the living reality itself is 
different, according to the facet from which it is regarded. Each 
individual lives in his own world, albeit that world at once conditions 
and is conditioned by the conception which enters into it of the 
general world of the time … The reproduction of the past in this 
latter sense … is a matter of feeling and, to a large extent, 
immediate intuition. (36)  
 
One implication of Bax’s view was that the ambition of conventional 
truth-seeking historians would forever be frustrated. His scepticism was not 
just that ‘historical narrative and historical romance’ could be placed in one 
category, but that whatever form it assumed, historical study could only ever 
serve as a ‘medium of picture-writing’. The purpose of the historian was to 
evoke an atmosphere or an impression of a past consciousness, the feelings 
and sentiments which Bax associated with the alogical.  At best, history was 
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properly a subject for art.  In this spirit, Bax identified Wagner as one of the 
nineteenth-century’s pre-eminent historians; in Meistersinger Wagner 
reproduced ‘the atmosphere of a past age in the art of the present’.  ‘We feel’, 
Bax generalised, ‘that the music brings us in contact with the consciousness 
of the late mediaeval German city. We feel that it touches in us some nerve in 
our consciousness that reawakens an echo of the consciousness of that 
remote time’. (37)   
Morris certainly did not share his assessment of Wagner, (though he 
permitted similar reference to the genius of Meistersinger in their joint 
authored work); and his view of history, though easily categorised as romance 
and perhaps a form of art, was also at odds with Bax’s view. (38)  His public 
agreement with Bax that the knowledge of history was always restricted by 
the boundaries of present did not suggest to him an impossibility of attaining 
historical knowledge. In News From Nowhere he gives his fictional characters 
knowledge of nineteenth-century history: of forestry in Epping Forest (39) and 
the events of 1887 in Trafalgar Square. (40)  The extended conversation 
Guest has with Old Hammond is similarly predicated on the future 
generation’s accurate grasp of nineteenth-century policies, behaviours and 
practices.  In an exchange about the value of nineteenth century scholarship, 
Morris observes that ‘history’ – by which he means future understandings of 
his nineteenth-century present - has ‘reversed contemporary judgments’, but 
he does not impugn the validity of Old Hammond’s account of education. (41)  
As if to highlight the value of history that his presence in the novel affirms, 
Morris also uses his position to force the future generation to reflect on their 
loss of historical memory and question the adequacy of their narrow concern 
with the present.  Old Hammond tells him that his ‘tales of the past’ bore the 
young. ‘The last harvest, the last baby, the last knot of carving in the market-
place, is history enough for them’. Born at yet another remove from the 
dystopia of the mid-twentieth century, the young have the assurance ‘of peace 
and continuous plenty’ and have no wish to be reminded of the past. (42)  
Dick confirms Old Hammond’s view: ‘it is mostly in periods of turmoil and strife 
and confusion that people care much about history and ... we are not like that 
now’.(43) Morris’s fear – which he shares with Ellen – is that by insulating 
themselves from the past, the future generation leave themselves badly 
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exposed to the possible reverses of history and the loss of utopia gained.  
Understanding Morris’s concerns and realising the lessons of oppression that 
his stories of the past contain, she remarks ‘that is not stated clearly enough 
in our history books, and it is worth knowing’. (44)  
Morris might have agreed with Bax that his idea of the past was as 
romantic as his image of the future – the facts might always be questioned 
and it was impossible to build a complete picture of either. He might also have 
agreed that judgments about social practices change over time. Nevertheless, 
and contrary to Bax, Morris gave history content and believed that it was 
possible to use it in order to reflect both on the condition of the present and 
the possibilities for the future.  To this extent, history was a source of 
knowledge: the knowledge of what tomorrow should be.   
 
 
Notes 
 
I would like to thank Florence and William Boos for testing some of the 
arguments presented in this paper; and I am grateful to the two anonymous 
referees who read an earlier version and thank them for their thoughtful and 
constructive criticism.   
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